May 17 2006
Book Review: States and Power in Africa
In States and Power in Africa, Jeffrey Herbst frequently uses the term “international system.” An instinctive reading of the term may lead to the idea of “international community” (another term that is frequently seen in the text), and there are moments in Herbst’s narrative that seem to support this interpretation. Yet Herbst repeatedly stresses the importance of state development in Africa to the international system : does he mean to say that the rise and fall of Zaire or Mali are seismic events in the world community?
In fact, I would posit, “international system ” refers to more than just one type of international system in Herbst book. Sometimes, the term refers to the Westphalia state model. Other times, it refers to a model that is specific to Africa only. Yet there are still moments when the term is used to mean a “meta-international system” that incorporates both the European and the African models.
First, Herbst recognizes that the Western states and the African states are fundamentally different. The Western states are built on the establishment and mutual recognition of sovereignty. But in Africa, many states have only limited sovereignty at best. For example, many African governments are effective only in urban areas; they have a hard time collecting taxes; some cannot even enforce a single currency within their borders (p226). But most telling of all: African states do not always have a monopoly on the use of force (p255).
Second, Herbst describes how the subsequently formed Western international system is equally different from the African international system. Whereas the Western system is bound together by the threat of anarchy and violence, the African system is more loosely organized but has a tradition of cooperation (p26). Although Herbst repeatedly assures us that, “fundamentally, there is nothing exotic about African politics,” (p31) there is nevertheless an overwhelming sense of “otherness” in how Herbst portrays the relationship between the Western and the African international systems. For example, Herbst states at one point, “It will … be up to the Africans to come up with alternatives to the nation-state. However, the international community can play an important role …” (p269) If the Africans are truly part of the international community, then why the “However,” but not “The rest of”?
Third, in order to have the two international systems (Western and the African) working together, Herbst urges the world to embrace a new system in which sovereignty is no longer a prerequisite (p269). To paraphrase Herbst: if the power or control is exercised within a sub-national unit (a tribe or a region, for example) why can’t the international agencies engage the sub-national unit directly? Assuming Herbst’s definition of engagement includes the representation of those units (or we are back to the Colonial days), he is in effect proposing a different international system—a meta-system as I termed earlier—that is a mishmash of sovereign states and non-sovereign polities. This meta-system is what he has in mind when he theorizes the relationship between state development and international system (p27).
The metamorphosis of the term “international system” reveals a fault line in Herbst’s work: in essence, he is trying to replace an existing concept (Westphalia international system) with a new one (meta-international system) by using terminologies that are alive only within the existing concept. Sovereignty, system, state and nation are terms conceived in the West, and are laden with Western historical experiences . Using terms such as “sovereignty” to construct an international system without sovereignty is bound to cause enormous confusion.
However, the misappropriation of terminologies is only a minor transgression compared to the implication of Herbst’s conclusion. What he advocates, in essence, is to relieve the suffering in Africa at the expense of state building . Yet he has failed to make the case that, without the kind of power that Western states have to mobilize resources within a secured border, the proto-states in Africa can survive in today’s global economy—one that was created by and for strong states only. Consequently, even if the international community can find ways to accommodate a continent full of chiefdoms, people in Africa may find themselves forever condemned to impoverishment and dependency.