May 17 2006
Book Review: Faith in Nation
In Faith in Nation, Anthony Marx delivers a spirited rebuttal of the “literary trope” (p 15) about a liberal, inclusive Western nationalism. Instead, he argues that even the “truest” brand of Western nationalism-that of England and France-came to being only after brutal fratricide of massive scale. His entire theory is based on a central position that nationalism developed much earlier than is popularly believed today. This leads one to question why does he insist on such a position? Has he made the case for it? What happens to his theory if the position turns out to be wrong?
I will argue that the definition of the state, or the lack thereof, is key to answering all of the above questions. Only by implicitly loosening the definition of the state, can Marx trace the genesis of Western nationalism back to as early as the 16th century, thus cementing the linkage between Western nationalism and religious violence. However, the liberal adaptation of the concept of the state puts Marx’s entire theory on shaky ground.
According to Marx, the state is the raison d’�tat of nationalism: for nationalism to become a historical force, it “must … refer to a state as an existing structure or potential object of engagement” (p8). Although he declares early and clearly what nationalism is (p4), he never spells out his definition of a state. In fact, what we would think of as a modern state today can hardly be found in 16th century Europe.
Only when the definition of a state is sufficiently loosened, can Marx backdate nationalism to the 16th century, when most of the political authorities at the time existed in the form of royal courts. Only after he pushes back the genesis of nationalism, can Marx connect the religious violence of the 16th century to nationalism. Only when the religious violence is viewed as part of the history of nation building, does it acquire significance in the nature of Western nationalism. Otherwise, the St. Barthelme Day massacre or the burnings at Smithfield is just another “normal” religious upheavals in history, thus any association the massacre or the burnings may have with nation building would be purely coincidental-as Liah Greenfeld implied when Marx quoted her in saying, “Frenchness was disassociating itself from Catholicism.” To Anthony Marx, however, French nationalism and its French Catholic identity are not external to each other. They are just different stages in the same dialectic process. Therefore, real “Frenchness” is actually the public oblivion in France of the strange relationship between the church and the state1.
Yet all the grand reasoning depends on Marx’s definition of the state. After all, can we call the royal courts of the 16th century “states”? Not only has Marx not given his readers a clear answer, some of his own writings seem to contradict each other. For example, Marx mentions that the Treaty of Westphalia marks the beginning of the modern states (p 35). But the French War of Religions and the reign of Mary Tudor-the very conflicts that are supposedly at the core of nation-state building-occurred almost a century earlier. Even if we use the later date, 1648, as the beginning of the state system, one still has to be cautious to label all subsequent political authorities “states”. Regardless whether Louis XIV actually said “I am the state”, the fact that monarchical authority is directly associated with an individual ruler makes it transient in nature (relative to institutionalized modern government), therefore it can hardly be designated the “object of engagement” for nationalist ideology.
Since Marx’s concept of the state is on shaky ground, his entire theory appears highly questionable. I would argue, however, there are two options that can salvage his arguments. One is to weaken the link between nationalism and the state. In other words, nationalism may develop independent of the state. This observation may have a wider application outside of the context of Western history than inside of it. The other option is to introduce a third element, such as political culture, that can bridge the violent past and state and nation building in later times. For example, one accepts that the massive fratricide did happen earlier than the emergence of the nation-state. Nevertheless, the bloodshed molded a new political culture, which manifested itself as a more inclusive nationalism when the nation-state took shape later. If such an interpretation proves to be a more sensible reading of history than that of Marx, then Marx’s criticism of Western nationalism can be easily appropriated to deconstruct the Western political culture-the liberal democracy-itself: that it has a ugly past but short memory. However, is the world ready for such a “total recall”?