Nov 01 2005
Book Review: The International Relations of Northeast Asia. Edited by Samuel Kim
The International Relations of Northeast Asia. Edited by Samuel Kim
The politics of Northeast Asia stands in stark contrast to that of Southeast Asia. Whereas the Southeast Asian countries view regional cooperation as instrumental to collective peace and prosperity, Northeast Asian regionalism may only become viable after each country in the region is assured of its own peace and prosperity.
Samuel Kim’s book is an informative source to tell us why. It is a collection of scholarly studies of the complex and fluid nature of national and regional politics in Northeast Asia. The authors adopted a variety of theoretical perspectives in examining the history of the region, from World War II to today’s globalization, and have presented insightful analysis of past state behaviors, as well as predictions to future changes.
Many authors in the book consider China, Japan and United States as the major players in the region. Although Korea peninsular and Taiwan are the hot-button points at the moment, the issues involved are relatively narrower in scope, and are easier to define. Furthermore, any possible solutions to those issues are largely dependent on how the major players interact.
Alastair Iain Johnston appears sympathetic to China’s causes. He argues extensively in the book why China should be considered as a conformative member of the world (though not necessarily regional) community. His presentation, however, is mostly defensive in tone. It appears that he is arguing against the proponents of “China-threat”, who Mr. Kim also singles out in the introduction.
Thomas Berger’s analysis of Japan’s Political and Security Dimensions is more detached but equally informative. For example, he devotes large portion of the essay to the unique nature of Japan’s defensive forces. The conclusion he draws, that this is due to “Japan’s historically rooted distrust of the coercive apparatus of the state”, may be arguable to some, but is refreshing nevertheless. He also highlights the conflicting nature of Japan’s international policy, and attributes that to the nation’s uncertainty of its own realist vs. liberal inclinations.
Kent E. Calder’s review on U.S. foreign policy in Northeast Asia is perhaps, in my opinion, the weakest and the least relevant of the book. His concentration on the Korea peninsular and military technology proliferation seems overtly centered on the immediate U.S. interests. One could argue that, in the age of “peaceful power struggle”, economic dynamics is playing an even more direct role than that of defense and security. However, his article is devoid of any in-depth discussion of the complicated and fast-changing relationships U.S. has to the region.
In his introduction, Mr. Kim acknowledges the difficulties to cover and to explain events in Northeast Asia. There are many seemingly in-reconcilable elements in each nation and the region as a whole. Given the various theoretical approaches each author chooses, and even divergent applications of each theory, it is almost impossible to write a review that is cogent and comprehensive enough to cover the entire book. Here I am going to write down some of my own thoughts while reading this book.
I agree with Mr. Kim that there is lack of liberal democracy in the region (p30). China is certainly out of discussion in this regard. Even in Japan, where democracy is institutionalized, it is not the “liberal” democracy as in the western sense. I’d argue that the kind of students movement in West Germany in the 60s is unimaginable even in today’s Japan. In terms of breaking from the past and re-orient a nation’s future based on open and rational discussion, it appears that Taiwan’s independence movement may have done more to deepen democratization than Japan’s Pacifist constitution.
It is apparent to me how strongly scholars in the book feel about the shaky foundation of the “China-threat” theory. By calling it “self-fulfilling”, many of them called into question some of the policy initiatives of the current administration. My observation is, with the departure of a few key neo-conservative figures, some of the policies from the 2nd Bush administration are actually getting more sophisticated.
For example, recent reports praised the patience and maturity of the U.S. delegation to the six-party talks. In the same token, it appears that the administration has come to terms that, in China, they will have to work with an authoritative regime for decades to come. Instead of putting the Sino-US relation in the light of Partner vs. Competitor, the administration is working to pry open a closed state machine in the name of greater global integration.
In his recent trip to China, Treasury Secretary John Snow demanded some concrete but fundamental changes, such as accelerating SOE privatization, establishing independent credit-rating agencies, and removing restrictions on FDI in Chinese banks. Timothy D. Adams, undersecretary at the Treasury Department, characterized those proposals as “a quantum leap in sophistication and scope”. I would agree with this assessment in that they are indeed more cost-effective measures. First of all, some of the demands are in concert with Chinese government’s long-term goals. This not only makes them more receptive, but will also secure U.S. influence in instituting subsequent reforms. Secondly, because the proposed changes are economic in nature, they are more likely to have an immediate positive (if carried out carefully) feedback, thus further solidify the forces for deeper reforms. In other words, compared to similar requests on rights issues, they could prove to be more sustainable. New developments like this, in my opinion, presents yet another proof that economic relations now are gradually replacing security issues at the core of today’s international relations.
[...] My thoughts: Political tension between the two: neither the two is a liberal democracy. “China is certainly out of discussion in this regard. Even in Japan, where democracy is institutionalized, it is not the “liberal” democracy as in the western sense. I’d argue that the kind of students movement in West Germany in the 60s is unimaginable even in today’s Japan. ” see the whole blog… [...]