Guo Liang, the director of the China Internet Project at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said he thought Google’s accusations were little more than public whining. “Google may use politics as its excuse, which is easy for Westerners to accept, but in essence this is just a business failure,” he said. “If I were the government, I wouldn’t even bother to respond.”
If the reporter didn’t quote you out of context, I have to say I strongly disagree with your stance. You may question Google’s ulterior motive, that is your prerogative. But if you just look at the matter at its own merit, whatever the Party-State has been doing cannot be justified. You may dismiss us as outsiders not in tune with reality in China. But reasonable people disagree. In this case, you also need to ask whether your reality is THE reality or whether outsiders’ opinion are naturally irrelevant just because they are outsiders.
In the end, what goes around, comes around. The limit of information flow in the name of “stability and harmony” will backfire. To me, information freedom is not as much about some abstract ideal as about dollars and senses. A billion people with “little smart” (小聪明) is, in the end, a billion brains wasted. If you think the creative ways Chinese are making money now is the same as innovation, I am afraid you are terribly mistaken and sourly missing the point. If Chinese citizens are trained only to think as they are allowed to but no more, what you end of having is “involution”–a term historians used to describe the late Qing China.
What is striking is that almost all of those riots happened at political/geographical periphery, with similar grievances and comparable destructive energy. But on the other end, at the center, all is too rosy: Taiwan seems never closer to returning than ever, the Olympics seems destined to be one of the most elaborate shows in Chinese history.
Is this a pattern–a bloating and self-delusional center with a deteriorating periphery–that has been repeated before? This is not a rhetorical question, but a genuine one. In the translation I did for Lavely and R. Bin Wong, they talked about how the Tai Ping Tian Guo was the result of collapsing local administrative capacities. But I wondered what the royal court looked like then? Was it also full of pump and circumstances?
The other thought:
What the hell is going on with Chinese media? Is there a quiet “汶川之春“ going on? Listen to this:
And this article is from a magazine (瞭望周刊) that is the “trade journal” of the official media and is, I believe, under direct central control. Read closely, the logic is contorted–it is a stretch to suggest “瓮安事件的处理显然在一定程度上汲取了汶川大地震的经验“. What is “obvious” to me is that this article is trying to construct a narrative and set a tone.
Is this a sign that some insiders are anxiously but cautiously trying to keep alive the opening after 汶川? I can’t help but wonder at what level this article is sanctioned? The fact that there was poor/old way of reporting of the 3.14 Tibetan riots suggests the old guards are still out there. Do they not smell out the wickedness in this article? Who in the Central Committee are they going to resort to? How are they going to fight back? Will this fight stay inside the party or spill out to the commercial media as well? Are there going to be a widespread rectification campaign after the Olympics–or even earlier?
I have been following what’s happening in 瓮安 for several days. It is fascinating for the following reasons:
1. What makes a story explosive?
2. How efficient and effective the Net police is
3. The common damage control technique by the Chinese government
The most comprehensive and the closest to the event can be found here: http://xinwenshe.blogspot.com/ (see postings around 6.28.2008 and several days later, including a video posting)
To be explosive, a story has to have an innocent victim, an evil perpetrator, and an open ending. In this case, the victims are innocent or at least powerless: the rape-murder victim, her uncle and mother. The perpetrators are the police and street thugs. And an open ending is clearly an invitation for action.
The Net police is VERY efficient: two days later, there is scant trace left on the Chinese Net. In fact, when I used Baidu.com, it has suggested several keywords, such as: 贵州瓮安, 瓮安事件, 贵州瓮安事件, 贵州瓮安6.28事件, 瓮安公安局, etc. Many of the posting titles are listed there. However, after 14 random clicks on those with negative titles, only three are left. One (http://www.dongkou.com/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=11486) had the original posting deleted but nasty comments remained. Isn’t this interesting?
The damage control seems to be:
1. Physical isolation: the roads cut off, news media shut out and a surge of police force
2. Synchronizing message on the cause: it is a few bad guys (黑恶势力人员) with a large “confused” mob (不明真相的群众)
3. Stick to the message: today, only one message left, such as: http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008-07/01/content_8468856.htm
So far, I believe the government has succeeded in putting a lid on the event.