What is striking is that almost all of those riots happened at political/geographical periphery, with similar grievances and comparable destructive energy. But on the other end, at the center, all is too rosy: Taiwan seems never closer to returning than ever, the Olympics seems destined to be one of the most elaborate shows in Chinese history.
Is this a pattern–a bloating and self-delusional center with a deteriorating periphery–that has been repeated before? This is not a rhetorical question, but a genuine one. In the translation I did for Lavely and R. Bin Wong, they talked about how the Tai Ping Tian Guo was the result of collapsing local administrative capacities. But I wondered what the royal court looked like then? Was it also full of pump and circumstances?
The other thought:
What the hell is going on with Chinese media? Is there a quiet “汶川之春“ going on? Listen to this:
And this article is from a magazine (瞭望周刊) that is the “trade journal” of the official media and is, I believe, under direct central control. Read closely, the logic is contorted–it is a stretch to suggest “瓮安事件的处理显然在一定程度上汲取了汶川大地震的经验“. What is “obvious” to me is that this article is trying to construct a narrative and set a tone.
Is this a sign that some insiders are anxiously but cautiously trying to keep alive the opening after 汶川? I can’t help but wonder at what level this article is sanctioned? The fact that there was poor/old way of reporting of the 3.14 Tibetan riots suggests the old guards are still out there. Do they not smell out the wickedness in this article? Who in the Central Committee are they going to resort to? How are they going to fight back? Will this fight stay inside the party or spill out to the commercial media as well? Are there going to be a widespread rectification campaign after the Olympics–or even earlier?
I have been following what’s happening in 瓮安 for several days. It is fascinating for the following reasons:
1. What makes a story explosive?
2. How efficient and effective the Net police is
3. The common damage control technique by the Chinese government
The most comprehensive and the closest to the event can be found here: http://xinwenshe.blogspot.com/ (see postings around 6.28.2008 and several days later, including a video posting)
To be explosive, a story has to have an innocent victim, an evil perpetrator, and an open ending. In this case, the victims are innocent or at least powerless: the rape-murder victim, her uncle and mother. The perpetrators are the police and street thugs. And an open ending is clearly an invitation for action.
The Net police is VERY efficient: two days later, there is scant trace left on the Chinese Net. In fact, when I used Baidu.com, it has suggested several keywords, such as: 贵州瓮安, 瓮安事件, 贵州瓮安事件, 贵州瓮安6.28事件, 瓮安公安局, etc. Many of the posting titles are listed there. However, after 14 random clicks on those with negative titles, only three are left. One (http://www.dongkou.com/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=11486) had the original posting deleted but nasty comments remained. Isn’t this interesting?
The damage control seems to be:
1. Physical isolation: the roads cut off, news media shut out and a surge of police force
2. Synchronizing message on the cause: it is a few bad guys (黑恶势力人员) with a large “confused” mob (不明真相的群众)
3. Stick to the message: today, only one message left, such as: http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008-07/01/content_8468856.htm
So far, I believe the government has succeeded in putting a lid on the event.
Didn’t want to do much but saw this poster and have to mark it down:
Really got a kick out of it!! By the way, the map is a real one, circa 1830s. Go Absolut!
I saw this right after seeing reports of the Olympic torch was extinguished three times in Paris amidst violent protests. Immediately I switched to Chinese news sites and saw almost nothing of it being reported.
This is totally fascinating because I’d think the development is a good thing for the Chinese government yet it chooses not to report it. Why is that?
Although in my paper, I am adopting Susan’s line to say it is useless to say if the state is strong or weak, by conventional standards, I’d say the government is very weak. It has such a tenuous hold on public opinion and national narrative, it chooses to put down anything that may generate excitement.
With regard to Tibet, in a “Absolut World”, the map should have been different. But there is little argument today what the map is. I am sure the Tibetans’ anger is legitimate. But they have to adjust their expectation: if Taiwan can’t become independent, where the Chinese government didn’t have any control for 60 years, Tibet has little hope to be independent either. For those who use East Timor or Kosovo as example, they really have to ask themselves whether those are exceptions or the rule.
Instead, the question of independence is now a wedge issue that split the Tibetans. If there is anything I want to tell them, that is, “don’t listen to the NGOs or Human Rights activists!” They can advocate indepedence because they don’t have to live with China. They can make all kinds of noise but they seldom deliver results. Most importantly, you have to have a unified front and you have to control the message.
Also, someone (Robbie Barnett?) brought up a good point: don’t forget the Chinese public in the whole issue. Dalai’s best hope is to have the Chinese public on his side. It was a improbably proposition. The way things are going, it looks like this is becoming increasingly impossible.
With regard to Tibet, in a “Absolut World”, the map should have been different. But there is little argument today what the map is. I am sure the Tibetans’ anger is legitimate. But they have to adjust their expectation: if Taiwan can’t become independent, where the Chinese government didn’t have any control for 60 years, Tibet has little hope to be independent either. For those who use East Timor or Kosovo as example, they really have to ask themselves whether those are exceptions or the rule.