Years of Poems and Spirits

There were two explosions on buses in Kun Ming (昆明). The news hit NYT first but apparently has been on the news allover China.

Two thoughts go in parallel:

What the hell is going on in China? Is the explosion of riots in periphery harbinger of greater turmoil to come? As Ming Pao (明報) suggests,

内地多个地区近日接连多宗爆发流血冲突及大规模民众抗议事件，继贵州瓮安、广东惠州早前发生骚乱后，广西钦州市日前也有上千民泷到市政府外示威，至少10 人被捕。而造成2人死亡，55人受伤的云南孟连县胶农骚乱事件，至昨日上午仍有数百民泷聚集，数百名公安民警已到场戒备，防止再有骚乱发生

What is striking is that almost all of those riots happened at political/geographical periphery, with similar grievances and comparable destructive energy. But on the other end, at the center, all is too rosy: Taiwan seems never closer to returning than ever, the Olympics seems destined to be one of the most elaborate shows in Chinese history.

Is this a pattern–a bloating and self-delusional center with a deteriorating periphery–that has been repeated before? This is not a rhetorical question, but a genuine one. In the translation I did for Lavely and R. Bin Wong, they talked about how the Tai Ping Tian Guo was the result of collapsing local administrative capacities. But I wondered what the royal court looked like then? Was it also full of pump and circumstances?

The other thought:

What the hell is going on with Chinese media? Is there a quiet “汶川之春“ going on? Listen to this:

20天前，6月20日，胡锦涛总书记在考察《人民日报》时发表了一篇重要讲话，其中特别提到了“按照新闻传播规律办事”，将之作为“提高舆论引导的权威性、公信力、影响力”的重要前提。

讲话中，胡锦涛还强调，“要完善新闻发布制度，健全突发公共事件新闻报道机制，第一时间发布权威信息，提高时效性，增加透明度，牢牢掌握新闻宣传工作的主动权。”

这与拉萨“3·14打砸抢事件”后国际舆论的表现形成鲜明对比。“公开”是撬动国际舆论转向的关键之举。

“6·28”瓮安事件的处理显然在一定程度上汲取了汶川大地震的经验。
事实上，瓮安事件发生后不到1小时，现场的视频、照片就出现在互联网上，随即大量小道消息、谣言在论坛、博客里传播，为事态变化推波助澜。而这很可能促动了其后官方主动发布信息。

And this article is from a magazine (瞭望周刊) that is the “trade journal” of the official media and is, I believe, under direct central control. Read closely, the logic is contorted–it is a stretch to suggest “瓮安事件的处理显然在一定程度上汲取了汶川大地震的经验“. What is “obvious” to me is that this article is trying to construct a narrative and set a tone.

Is this a sign that some insiders are anxiously but cautiously trying to keep alive the opening after 汶川? I can’t help but wonder at what level this article is sanctioned? The fact that there was poor/old way of reporting of the 3.14 Tibetan riots suggests the old guards are still out there. Do they not smell out the wickedness in this article? Who in the Central Committee are they going to resort to? How are they going to fight back? Will this fight stay inside the party or spill out to the commercial media as well? Are there going to be a widespread rectification campaign after the Olympics–or even earlier?

本不想再动笔,但”树欲静而风不止”. 翁安事件后, 离发生地不远的贵阳市在其属下的5个区县展开”海选”.

贵阳“海选”县委书记 瓮安事件成“命题焦点”:

“… 贵阳市日前召开公推竞岗动员大会，决定对花溪区、修文县等出缺的4个区、县党委书记职位，采取公推竞岗的方式择优选拔。消息传出后，即刻在全国引起强烈反响。中央电视台新闻频道也罕有地在昨日对竞岗现场在重要时段做了直播。值得注意的是，在本次竞聘答辩中，贵州瓮安“6·28”事件成为“命题焦点”… 贵阳“海选”区、县党委书记消息传出后，即刻在全国引起强烈反响。在百度、google等搜索，其相关网页均分别达到千个以上，人民网、新华网等国内知名网站和媒体也纷纷对该消息进行了转载或报道，引发热议。”

香港明报的标题是”翁安海选以息民愤”. Although the title was inaccurate (Weng An is not part of the Gui Yang municipality), the connection may not be far off. But that is just fascinating!

1. China has had few (none notable enough that I read) semi-free elections (i.e. direct vote and open candidacy) beyond village level. That is something Whiting drilled into our heads. So how significant is this event?

2. The change of procedure comes right after a widely reported riot and amidst widespread cynicism, I don’t know whether this is a sign of weakness/desparation or that of confidence? How much this is used as a ploy to defuse tension, or is this an instance where local reformers/a new generation of leaders are trying to find space to maneuver?

3. Isn’t this an unique opportunity to measure/observe how ready (local) civic culture is to reshape politics? The setting is perfect: something dramatic is happening in the political periphery, like 洋务运动, 公车上书, Deng’s reform, etc. If a participatory and disciplined civil culture is there but dormant under suppression, then this is an opportunity where a new equilibrium (it may take a long while) may form. However, if there is no such a civic culture, the vacuum will be soon re-filled by petty despotism.

What would Elizabeth Perry say?

I have been following what’s happening in 瓮安 for several days. It is fascinating for the following reasons:
1. What makes a story explosive?
2. How efficient and effective the Net police is
3. The common damage control technique by the Chinese government

The most comprehensive and the closest to the event can be found here: http://xinwenshe.blogspot.com/ (see postings around 6.28.2008 and several days later, including a video posting)

To be explosive, a story has to have an innocent victim, an evil perpetrator, and an open ending. In this case, the victims are innocent or at least powerless: the rape-murder victim, her uncle and mother. The perpetrators are the police and street thugs. And an open ending is clearly an invitation for action.

The Net police is VERY efficient: two days later, there is scant trace left on the Chinese Net. In fact, when I used Baidu.com, it has suggested several keywords, such as: 贵州瓮安, 瓮安事件, 贵州瓮安事件, 贵州瓮安6.28事件, 瓮安公安局, etc. Many of the posting titles are listed there. However, after 14 random clicks on those with negative titles, only three are left. One (http://www.dongkou.com/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=11486) had the original posting deleted but nasty comments remained. Isn’t this interesting?

The damage control seems to be:
1. Physical isolation: the roads cut off, news media shut out and a surge of police force
2. Synchronizing message on the cause: it is a few bad guys (黑恶势力人员) with a large “confused” mob (不明真相的群众)
3. Stick to the message: today, only one message left, such as: http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008-07/01/content_8468856.htm

So far, I believe the government has succeeded in putting a lid on the event.