Years of Poems and Spirits

Read 驻京办主任 (1 and 2) after Steve C recommended it. He asked me whether I can still “handle” China but I was interested in the central-local relationship.

The book is similar to a pretty stylized mini TV series: bad guys are bad all around and good guys are good inside out, “邪不压正”, etc. And there isn’t as much discussion of central-local tensions till the 2nd series, which, when it comes to that, is very revealing:

 驻京办的迅猛增长，正好契合了中央和地方分权的历史演变，其中尤以1994年中央与地方分税制改革之后为甚，自1994年的分税制改革以来，我国政府财政的集中程度不断提高。分税制的确立为中央政府的财政提供了制度性保障，也改变了中央政府在财政方面高度依赖于地方政府的局面。在财政不足的情况下，地方政府经济发展的任务和公共管理的职能却不断加重，财政支出的压力增大，这就使中央政府的财政转移支付，成了地方政府重要的收入来源。因此，驻京办兴盛的背后，是各部委资源配置权力太大，财政转移支付程序欠透明是一个重要原因，我认为驻京办不可能一撤了之。

Also, according to the book, the central transfers are often NOT included in local’s budgets! No wonder 驻京办事处 become so prominent and prevalent.

Two years ago, I’d thought this is abnormal and is something that can be amended by policy or institutional design. Now, I don’t think so any more: the central-local tension is part of China political economy that is beyond regime or even civilization (薄一波在他的《回顾》中说自建国以来，中国的经济一直是：一放就乱，一乱就紧，一紧就死，一死就叫，一叫又放。)

There is certainly an institutional design component: one may argue that focus on GDP, including the bias toward growth in cadre evaluation, calls for locals to game the system. Therefore, however hard the center tries, it still can’t make 全国一盘棋–even when provincial heads are centrally appointed.

But defects in institutional design do not explain prevalent corruption. Not even the misaligned center-local interests can explain that. In other words, you can have very clean local officials who still undermine national economy in pursuit of local interests.

Corruption seems to be best explained by property rights (and its principal-agent implication). A national economy has a certain amount of endowed assets–land, natural resources or labor that can only be mobilized politically. The marketization of those assets is often a monopolized process (because the assets are considered public), particularly when there is a pretty strong government (i.e. an agent of public interests).

The natural conclusion is that it is an ill that cannot be solved by political reform alone (e.g. corrupt but democratic countries like India). It may solve the agency problem but certainly not the rights ill.

But how can one privatize public assets and keep them efficiently deployed without creating injustice? I think this is the real question. Is Norway a possible exception to this? I really need to study the Scandinavian countries more …

Book: The Origins of Totalitarianism

To put it harshly, The Origins of Totalitarianism is more like a political manifesto than a scientific thesis. The locus of Arendt’s work is the Holocaust hence the applicability and reasoning are rather questionable.

Arendt is not just any Jewish survivor. A student and a lover of the preeminent 20th century philosopher, Martin Heidegger, Arendt had rightfully consider herself a member of the upper echelon of the the Western civilization before, suddenly, she was nearly cannibalized by it. Therefore, for Arendt, the most pressing question for her was “what has gone so wrong”?

In pursuit of an answer to this question, Arendt chooses to forgo the cultural and historical peculiarity of the German nation but to extrapolate a general condition which she argues could forster a monsterous extremist regime.

A central character in her definition of Totalitarianism is the movement’s global aspiration. The existence of an ideology aiming for world domination (quotes needed) is a prerequisit. Although such a framework explains well Nazism and Communism, it fails to explain racial or ethnic triggered mass hysteria. Even today, as what used to be unthinkable in America (p 420 a country least exposed to mass psychology) becomes legal (e.g. warrantless surveillance, suspension of habeas corpus, etc.), what the silent majority buy into is not a desire of world domination or salvation but “homeland” security.

Does Totalitarianism exist as one of the “-ism” of the 20th century? Or even, is there a “sin test”–I know it when I see it–of Totalitarianism? If mass murder of the innocent is a inevitable outcome of a Totalitarian regime, as Arendt suggests, the evidence in the late 20th century offers little support–one can hardly say that what happened in Rwanda and Bosnia were perpetrated by totalitarian regimes.

In other words, mass murder cannot happen unless the entire society goes along with a few fanatics. In her book, the chapter on “the classless society” is the one that I can relate to the most: fanaticism is possible when there is a breakdown of social orders (class not in the traditional Marxist sense). But even a chaotic social order is a necessary condition, it is clearly not a sufficient one. For Industrialization and Republicanization (French style) were both traumatic events in history yet not all societies lived through them became radical as did the German, Russian and Chinese nations. In France, the Dreyfus case–as extensively discussed by Arendt–is a case in point: there was clearly a suffocating antisemitic sentiment at the beginning, but it fizzled as quickly as it started (quotes needed).

Therefore, given similar social conditions, given that political and psychological manipulation is innate to human beings as there are demagogues in every historical period in every society, why some nations degerated into totalitarianism, but some did not?

Or, to put the question differently, if there exists a transcendent Totalitarian model, why did it not manifest itself every where, every time? Arendt herself in the 1950 preface says that she wrote the book “out of the conviction that it should be possible to discover the hidden mechanics by which all traditional elements of our political and spiritual world were dissolved into a conglomeration”. Yet even after she seems to have identified many, if not all, of those mechanics, she has yet to convince me that the existence of those mechanics along is enough to breed Totalitarianism.

After the Holocaust, man finds itself still capable of watching massacres unfold in Rwanda and Balkan, and mass hysteria reign in North Korea and, most recently, South Africa. It appears that if history is of any guidance, what Arendt labels as “hidden mechanics” are not that “hidden” compared to something deeper underlying every holocaust.

My observation is that the likelihood of Totalitarianism is negatively related to the liberal tradition of a society. The liberal tradition refers to not only the depth but also the breadth of its societal penatration. In other words, a society that features a clan of intelligentsia and a huge disparity is as illiberal as one that features an undereducated mass.

During the oral defense of my paper, Prof. Chirot asked a question he’d asked us before, “would you call the nationalist sentiments in China, Korea or Vietnam ‘nationalism’”? I thought I answered it rather well: nationalism in its purest form is a Western concept. I am leaning more toward Hans Kohn (”Idea of Nationalism”) and Gellner (”Nations and Nationalism”) that nationalism is a product of the Enlightenment and/or Industrialization. It is associated with the secularization and democratization movement in the 18th and 19th century. With regard to the national identity present among East Asian polities, I stated those should not be labeled “nationalism” because “a body of knowledge only becomes so if it worked. Otherwise, it is just another experiment”.

That is what I implied in the Caribbean paper, that is, nation building does not end with declaration of independence. To expand it further, I don’t think German and Japanese nation building should be labeled as instances of nationalism, since their nation building exercises lead both to path of (self-)destruction. The polities resulted were still monarchical and authoritarian.

In short, my answer to Chirot’s question is not a teleological statement, rather it is a historicist one.

I am also reading Ann Anagnost’s “National Past-Times: Narrative, Representation, and Power in China”. She frequently cited the national narrative in post-colonial countries as references. I wonder whether she’s bought into the structuralist argument of nationalism. But I have to finish reading it first. It is not an easy read by the way–I can re-write her Introduction part with phrases much easier to understand. For example, instead of saying China has large regional differences and varying ethos in recent times, she uses terms like “spatial and temporal” this and that. Scary, scary.