Jul 22 2006
Notes on Holding China Together II
Cheng Li: Political Localism Versus Institutional Restraints: Elite Recruitment …
How local power is integrated into national system: local representation in party committee (31)
Number of provincial heads in central leadership (32-33) quick promotion too
Elite have to have local portfolio in order to advance (34)
Interesting conflicts/factoids about localities:
Inland deputies blocked Shanghai nominees (35)
High concentration of Shang Dong people in military officier ranks (38)
Shanghai Gang only in the central leadership, not able to penetrate other local leaderships. (46)
Law of Avoidance:
Coded in laws/regulations/personnel systems (49, 62)
Exception: At lower level, deputy leaders are more likely natives (50)
Term Limits:
Even apply to military officiers (54)
Checks and Balances Chinese Style:
中纪委: has local and military representatives (59)
Party school: county level party secretaries have to go through training (66)
Incidents of power struggle during Jiang and the author’s interpretation:
Princelings must be explicitly approved by 中央组织部。(66)
Some princelings were humiliated during party congress (including current Commerce Minister, 薄熙来,Jiang’s former bodyguard and Deng’s son)
Zhiyue Bo: The Institutionalization of Elite Management in China
… Chinese politics has long been regarded as essentially informal (70) See notes on a UC Berkeley’s project on informal politics in East Asia in the 1990s. The March 1996 issue of Asian Survey has a special issue.
These formal powers notwithstanding, the reality is that the CCP continues to dominate the government and the People’s Congress … thorugh its control of the personnel process. (73)
Government and PC candidate nomination process (75)
The Nomination Process (section) 78
… detailed guidelines on how party leaders could strictly follow legal procedures while retaining their influence in elite management ….
Pre-screening candidates (agreed to nominate some comrade for some post …)
The party committee should not make the appointment in its own name, … Instead, the party should operate behind the scens through its various organizations (75-76)
Party head as People’s Congress head since 1990s. (The trend reversed in the 1990s, however, and … party secretaries … taken on the chairmanship of their respective provincial PC) (76)
The Rule of Avoidance and Conflict of Interest (84)
Avoidance rule codified in 1995.
Transfers (90)
Susan Whiting: The Cadre Evaluation System at the Grass Roots: The Paradox of Party Rule
The Principal-Agent model by Terry Moe (The New Economics of Oranization)
Some sample cadre evaluation criteria (105, 107)
Incentive disparity (111) … the bonus for industrial output and profits … The income of the village party secretary, who failed to meet his industrial targets …
The downside: moral hazard problem and gaming the system (112), e.g. overcapacity, selective tax collection …
The problem of multitasking: Sheer number and variety of tasks … multiple indicators were not necessarily mutually compatible (116)
—Thoughts:
Cadre evaluation is an alternative/substitute of civil service exam?
Does Prof. Whiting see a short-termed nature in cadre evaluation system? If so, could this topic be explored further to argue that the CCP is using means to strengthen the party at the expense of the nation.
The closest Whiting got to: 116-117
… organizations in general “avoid pay-for-performance systems based on objective performance evaluation. Paradoxically, however, continued reliance on the cadre … system may have contributed to the durability of CPP rule. Indeed, recent documents … explicitly identify it as an important means for ensuring competence and checking corruption.”