Years of Poems and Spirits

China and Taiwan have embarked on two very different courses toward their respective future political order. The fact that the courses are diverging and diverging fast is not as surprising as the irony the divergence illustrates:
1. Taiwan has been moving toward popular, liberal and participatory democracy, which is good;
2. China has been moving toward authoritarian and exclusive governing style (e.g. economic and political alienation of large population in poverty), which is bad;

But now, Taiwan is in this anti-Chen turmoil and Chinese leadership is reported to have further strengthened its power. If one looks from political institution-building perspective, the good and bad are reversed:
1. Taiwan’s mass (or mob?) democracy is destroying its political institutions. The consequence is that it forms a terrible cognition/tradition/legacy of “politicking” (i.e. political culture). The question the island folks should ask themselves today is no longer “should we fight for democracy” but “should we sacrifice for democracy”?
2. On the other hand, the main land CCP is doing quite well (from the surface at least). A recent NYT article portrays Zeng QingHong as a savvy politician: he was Jiang ZeMing’s right handed man but turned on him when it became apparent Hu was to succeed Jiang. Indeed he might have sacrificed his personal loyalty or principle somewhat. But by so doing and being who he is (a powerful party whip), he helps to strengthens a political institution which emphasizes consensus, stability, and discipline. The institution can afford to go on generating cultural symbols to further unite and discipline the populace (an example would be Hu’s “harmonious society doctrine”–what does it mean? who interprets it? do you interpret it the same way as what it supposed to mean?) More importantly, those symbols may help to slow/retard general political participation, which further enhances political institution’s efficacy.

This turn of events also illustrates the impact of individuals. In general, at early stage of political changes, individual leaders almost always assert a larger role (again, thanks God for marginal analysis). What if Yeltsin were CCP boss? Or Deng the Russian CP boss?

In the same way, one can say that Cheng Shuibian is the curse of Taiwan’s democracy. How his party gained power was no fundamentally different from how Mao and CCP did on mainland, namely through revolution. Not just any revolution, but a particular brand of revolution that is based on negative emotional appeal.

Again, I see an irony here: on the one hand, Taiwan couldn’t have had liberal democracy without Chen: without Chen, Taiwan could be another Singapore: faux liberalism with primordial taboos. On the other, Taiwan cannot foster a lasting democracy with Chen in power either: respecting institutions is not how he or his party gained power. As Mao onced said of himself, in the end, he was more of a monkey (as in “recklessness”) than of a Conqueror (as in “rule-giving”). Looks like the same can be said of Chen Shuibian.