Years of Poems and Spirits

Collected the following during the paper-writing days, never had the chance to write them down. Here they are:

The New Yorker:

2007/11/12 James Surowiecki: why high compensation structure may undermine Principals’ interests:
1. Hedge fund managers reap large rewards on the upside without a correspondingly punitive downside
2. Stock option grant may “underplay risk is at work in … corporate America”
3. Higher portion of stock options in CEO pay lead to higher stock volatility (data available)

July 7-14, 2008: Adam Kirsch’s story about John Keats:
Very moving recount of a genius whose talent precedes his time. The article reminded me of a rather obscure essay written by Christian Andersen, “The Thorny Road of Honor“. I read the Chinese version (光荣的荆棘路) translated by 叶君健 when I was 15 years old. It made my blood boil and led me to a rather literary youth.

Keats’ life seems to be another moving case of redemption: in his death bed, he was bemoaning his lack of achievement,

‘I have left no immortal work behind me—nothing to make my friends proud of my memory—but I have lov’d the principle of beauty in all things, and if I had had time I would have made myself remember’d.’

He dictated his own epitaph, “Here lies one whose name was writ on water”.

His sense of mortality echoes particularly loud in me: “I have an habitual feeling of my real life having past, and that I am leading a posthumous existence.”

It wasn’t an easy read at all. But considering this book: Stanley Plumly “Posthumous Keats” (Norton; $27.95)

Oct 15, Jerome Groopman, Silent Minds:

How patients in vegetative state can still recognize faces, understand sentences and even imagine playing tennis. It is a very heavy read. But was impressed by the research methods.

Nov. Connie Bruck, Rough Rider:

“Liquidity equals value.” Very enlightening. Really solidified my view on the nature of Liquidity.

Foreign Affairs:

Richard Betts, “A Disciplined Defense“:  Many figures available on defense spending, historical comparison and mis-appropriation.

Michael Desch, “Bush and the Generals“: A very spirited critique of the current civilian-military relations. Insightful reading of Huntington’s “The Soldier and the State”. Also in the context: McMaster’s thesis, etc.

Yuliya Tymoshenko, “Containing Russia“: That was an awesome article. Realist arguments at its best. Reminded me of the time of 苏秦，张仪.

There were two explosions on buses in Kun Ming (昆明). The news hit NYT first but apparently has been on the news allover China.

Two thoughts go in parallel:

What the hell is going on in China? Is the explosion of riots in periphery harbinger of greater turmoil to come? As Ming Pao (明報) suggests,

内地多个地区近日接连多宗爆发流血冲突及大规模民众抗议事件，继贵州瓮安、广东惠州早前发生骚乱后，广西钦州市日前也有上千民泷到市政府外示威，至少10 人被捕。而造成2人死亡，55人受伤的云南孟连县胶农骚乱事件，至昨日上午仍有数百民泷聚集，数百名公安民警已到场戒备，防止再有骚乱发生

What is striking is that almost all of those riots happened at political/geographical periphery, with similar grievances and comparable destructive energy. But on the other end, at the center, all is too rosy: Taiwan seems never closer to returning than ever, the Olympics seems destined to be one of the most elaborate shows in Chinese history.

Is this a pattern–a bloating and self-delusional center with a deteriorating periphery–that has been repeated before? This is not a rhetorical question, but a genuine one. In the translation I did for Lavely and R. Bin Wong, they talked about how the Tai Ping Tian Guo was the result of collapsing local administrative capacities. But I wondered what the royal court looked like then? Was it also full of pump and circumstances?

The other thought:

What the hell is going on with Chinese media? Is there a quiet “汶川之春“ going on? Listen to this:

20天前，6月20日，胡锦涛总书记在考察《人民日报》时发表了一篇重要讲话，其中特别提到了“按照新闻传播规律办事”，将之作为“提高舆论引导的权威性、公信力、影响力”的重要前提。

讲话中，胡锦涛还强调，“要完善新闻发布制度，健全突发公共事件新闻报道机制，第一时间发布权威信息，提高时效性，增加透明度，牢牢掌握新闻宣传工作的主动权。”

这与拉萨“3·14打砸抢事件”后国际舆论的表现形成鲜明对比。“公开”是撬动国际舆论转向的关键之举。

“6·28”瓮安事件的处理显然在一定程度上汲取了汶川大地震的经验。
事实上，瓮安事件发生后不到1小时，现场的视频、照片就出现在互联网上，随即大量小道消息、谣言在论坛、博客里传播，为事态变化推波助澜。而这很可能促动了其后官方主动发布信息。

And this article is from a magazine (瞭望周刊) that is the “trade journal” of the official media and is, I believe, under direct central control. Read closely, the logic is contorted–it is a stretch to suggest “瓮安事件的处理显然在一定程度上汲取了汶川大地震的经验“. What is “obvious” to me is that this article is trying to construct a narrative and set a tone.

Is this a sign that some insiders are anxiously but cautiously trying to keep alive the opening after 汶川? I can’t help but wonder at what level this article is sanctioned? The fact that there was poor/old way of reporting of the 3.14 Tibetan riots suggests the old guards are still out there. Do they not smell out the wickedness in this article? Who in the Central Committee are they going to resort to? How are they going to fight back? Will this fight stay inside the party or spill out to the commercial media as well? Are there going to be a widespread rectification campaign after the Olympics–or even earlier?

In sociology, reflexivity is an act of self-reference where examination or action ‘bends back on’, refers to, and affects the entity instigating the action or examination. In brief, reflexivity refers to circular relationships between cause and effect.  (Wiki entry)

Is this an answer to the criticism of Structualism? Found this through Soros’ investment theory/observation:

Soros argues that such transitions in the fundamentals of the economy are typically marked by disequilibrium rather than equilibrium, and that the conventional economic theory of the market (the ‘efficient market hypothesis‘) does not apply in these situations. Soros has popularized the concepts of dynamic disequilibrium, static disequilibrium, and near-equilibrium conditions.

Reflexivity is based on three main ideas:

1. Reflexivity is best observed under special conditions where investor bias grows and spreads throughout the investment arena. Examples of factors that may give rise to this bias include (a) equity leveraging or (b) the trend-following habits of speculators.
2. Reflexivity appears intermittently since it is most likely to be revealed under certain conditions; i.e., the equilibrium process’s character is best considered in terms of probabilities.
3. Investors’ observation of and participation in the capital markets may at times influence valuations AND fundamental conditions or outcomes.

The last point can be found in “A Demon of Our Own Design“. The first point may be explained by information asymmetry and/or the game theory.

I am a bit confused: if this is so obvious, how come I have never heard of it before?